Systemic risk propagated through over-the-counter derivatives can best be managed by a public-private central counterparty clearing house (CCP). Though private CCPs provide an adequate amount of clearing's private good, they do not provide the socially optimal level of the public good or impure goods. By undersupplying both public and impure goods, private CCPs may exacerbate the conditions under which financial crises develop and propagate. A public-private partnership could align incentives so that the CCP produces the socially optimal level of the private, public, and impure goods. A partnership using a two-part pricing scheme for OTC structured composite transactions could properly compensate both partners and provide an effective policy instrument for controlling systemic risk. Moreover this structure, in contrast to current proposed government regulations, will not drive out the -good‖ with the -bad‖ OTC derivative instruments.
Introduction
Over the course of the most recent financial crisis, the government, lacking regulatory mechanisms to deal with firms whose failure could trigger the failure of other firms through the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, was forced to manage the systemic risk posed by large financial institutions on an ad hoc and ex post basis. To prevent cascading defaults, the government facilitated the sale of some large financial institutions (e.g. Bear Stearns), allowed others to declare bankruptcy (e.g., Lehman
Brothers), and injected capital into many through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (e.g., Bank of America). Even the treatment of firms that struggled after receiving payments through TARP was unpredictable; Citigroup and AIG received additional support through direct public investment while CIT received no further assistance beyond the initial support of $2.33 billion. The ad hoc nature of this process is unlikely to have been the most economically efficient choice except in the sense that urgency required action. These events have demonstrated the need to develop a clear regulatory framework to efficiently manage systemic risk whether posed by the OTC market or otherwise.
In August, 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, speaking of the government bailouts in response to the financial crisis, warned that, -If no countervailing actions are taken, what would be perceived as an implicit expansion of the safety net could exacerbate the problem of ‗too big to fail,' possibly resulting in excessive risk-taking and yet greater systemic risk in the future‖ (Bernanke, 2008 ). Bernanke's call for -countervailing actions‖ in the financial system is an explicit recognition that new public policy tools are needed to manage the underlying causes of systemic risk. Though many in the public sector are devising regulations to manage systemic risks, the focus of these activities is largely on regulation of the operational management of financial intermediaries, rather than on developing policy instruments to directly manage the potential for propagation of default risk in the economy. 1 In this paper we propose that systemic default risk be managed directly through the creation of a central counterparty clearing house (CCP). A CCP for OTC derivatives can be designed to decrease systemic risk by eliminating default risk between the counterparties to an OTC contract and by moderating the financial incentives to accumulate -excessive risk‖ in OTC markets. 2 The lack of such a CCP for OTC derivatives, particularly CDS's, has been labeled as a significant factor in the current financial crisis (Acharya, et al., 2009) How do we establish good regulatory structure without destroying the incentive to innovate, without destroying the marketplace? We agree that we need to improve our regulations and to ensure that markets, firms, and financial products are subject to proper regulation and oversight. For example, credit default swaps-financial products that ensure against potential losses-should be processed through centralized clearinghouses. (Bush, 2008) The Executive Branch's current proposal (Treasury, 2009) systemic risk posed by OTC derivatives and promoting transparency in the OTC market.
This proposal calls for clearing -standardized OTC derivative transactions‖ and increasing -regulatory capital requirements‖ on non-standardized derivatives 3 , though it contains no detailed plans for accomplishing these objectives. If this proposal is accepted by Congress, it is unclear how regulatory capital requirements will be set.
Though European regulators have expressed a similar desire to reform the OTC derivatives market, there have been no concrete white papers or proposals to implement centralized clearing or to establish -sufficient‖ capital requirements for all OTC transactions. This lack of official proposals, and abundance of ad hoc solutions, has resulted in confused -rules of the game‖ and thus increased uncertainty and risk aversion related to the OTC market. 4 Systemic risk remains opaque and regulators lack the necessary instruments to manage that risk.
The heart of the dilemma faced by policy makers in reforming the derivatives market is its size and complexity. As of June 2008, the notional value of all outstanding OTC financial contracts was in excess of $680 trillion, according to the Bank for International Settlements (2008) (Figure 1 ). In contrast, the value of all cleared derivatives traded by private regulated exchanges was below $20 trillion in notional value. Given the limitless variation among derivatives (i.e., underlying assets, terms and conditions, etc.) establishing capital requirements and clearing for this market has long been technologically infeasible. Only recently have technology and financial theory reached the point that centralized clearing for both vanilla and complex derivatives is possible.
The government cannot rely on the private sector alone to clear OTC derivatives, and must take an active role in creating and managing a CCP. Government backing is an essential ingredient, since it is the guarantor of last resort. Compensation to the government for providing such insurance, should be explicitly recognized by forming a 3 Here we draw the usual distinction between standardized, or vanilla, OTC derivatives that have fixed terms and conditions and custom, or complex, OTC derivatives that have variable terms and conditions 4 Not only are the -rules of the game‖ unclear to market participants but also to the government regulators. For rescues of institutions deemed -too big to fail‖ the lack of government regulation -disclosure is striking‖ (WSJ, 2009 
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We advance a proposal to (1) centrally clear both standardized and complex derivatives with real-time permissioning and clearing, (2) explicitly recognize the public-private partnership structure needed to effectively manage systemic risk, (3) provide an analytical framework for centralized clearing of all OTC contracts using 2-part pricing to overcome the misalignment of public/private incentives, and (4) incorporate government policy instruments to allow the public sector to be compensated for controlling systemic risk over the business cycle. Instead of imposing excessive capital requirements suggested by government proposals, which would increase the cost of capital of trading such instruments, driving out the -good‖ with the -bad‖, our proposed framework will design a clearing solution that can accommodate all derivatives. This would allow traders to benefit from the -good‖ complex contracts, and, with centralized clearing, limit the damage from the -bad‖ complex contracts.
Private Sector Clearing Initiatives
There many private sector initiatives to clear OTC derivatives and we will review the leading US and European efforts: IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Eurex, and Euronext. These financial institutions began clearing OTC derivatives in response to pressure from both the public and private sectors following the most recent financial crisis. The CCPs have recently opened and begun clearing a small set of OTC contracts that will slowly expand as the CCPs develop methods to standardize contracts and establish efficient margin requirements hoping to create sufficient liquidity. ICE's largest US competitor, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) group, is a partnership between the largest US futures market and Citadel Investment Group. Though CME group has regulatory approval, its clearing and trading platform for CDS has not begun operations. The CCP plans to use Citadel's trading platform with a central order book for highly liquid issues. Though the CME-Citadel CCP's $7 billion fund is the largest CCP default pool, it would be insufficient to cover defaults by large financial institutions.
Clearing in the US

Clearing in Europe
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Public-Private Partnership and the Assignment of Control
A public-private-partnership (PPP) can be formed to manage an OTC derivatives CCP to ensure the optimal level of the public, private, and impure goods are produced. A PPP could provide adequate capitalization and ensure transparency while maintaining incentives to facilitate trades through the assignment of control rights. The PPP literature has shown that ownership should be determined by the type of good produced and in the case of impure goods, joint management by the public and private sectors can be optimal (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Besley and Ghatak , 2001; Francesconi and Muthoo, 2006) .
Joint ownership, which is determined by the contractual assignment of control rights, can provide both sectors incentives to invest their resources and each sufficient control to ensure socially optimal levels of production (Appendix 1).
A public-private OTC clearing partnership is inevitable, given the systemic importance of an OTC clearing and recent public sector support for failing financial institutions to prevent cascading defaults. If, during a financial crisis, a CCP becomes insolvent, the government will be expected to act as lender of last resort. In the academic literature, models of private OTC clearing implicitly assume the government would bailout a CCP to prevent widespread default, though there is no formal public involvement or any compensation for the public sector to provide such services (Jones and Perignon, 2009) .
If the partnership is explicitly recognized ex ante by forming a public-private CCP, the government can manage system risk over the business cycle by choosing to be compensated for the services it provides to stem systemic risk. If the partnership is designed ex post, the implicit insurance provided by the public sector will only be compensated on an ad hoc basis. But, the point of ex ante management is to moderate the forces that lead to excess in advance rather than ex post. Beyond compensating the government and strengthening their control over systemic risk, the creation of an explicit partnership clarifies the -rules of the game‖ for derivatives markets and reduces uncertainty over the government's role during a financial crisis.
An additional feature of the public-private partnership we propose concerns the matter of which contracts should be traded on an exchange. The initial set of formerly OTC contracts private CCPs will clear, a small set of CDS indexes, do not go far enough to ensure a sufficiently large set of contracts. 12 Because information on the non-cleared contracts is not published, the public does not see signals from mark to market price changes in OTC contracts. The public partner could achieve transparency by inclusion of the remaining OTC contracts that would provide a market test for mark to model assets (e.g., mortgage-backed securities) that cannot be accurately priced in the current market because critical forward markets do no exist (e.g. there is no forward market for foreclosure rates). Obviously an issue arises regarding trading volume because the private partner will have no interest in listing contracts for which there is inadequate liquidity.
In general, regulations should foster low transaction costs in order to enhance the potential for liquidity in the OTC markets. In the OTC marketplace, transaction costs include negotiating costs, risk-sharing costs, technology costs, collateral costs, clearing/guarantor costs, and enforcement costs. One reason that many OTC markets have low liquidity has historically been high transaction costs. However, over the last decade, technology costs have been driven dramatically lower by the advance of electronic communication networks. This has helped fuel the growth in the OTC markets.
Enforcement costs (e.g. legal impediments, bankruptcy rules, etc.) have also become lower over time. Our proposal would continue this trend by lowering the cost of clearing and guarantee services which are currently inefficiently set. Any proposed rules requiring the majority of the OTC market to be conducted using only standardized contracts would have the adverse consequences of increasing transaction costs and reducing liquidity for customized, non-standardized contracts. 
Request-for-Quote Transaction Platform
An RFQ platform allows the market, not the CCP, to determine the set of OTC contracts that will be traded and cleared. The transaction process begins on an RFQ trading platform when a subscriber creates and posts the terms to a derivative contract. For example, if a subscriber chooses to create a calendar spread on an RFQ platform, they determine the underlying, strike price, class, quantity, and buy and sell expiration dates Price Reporting Authority) take complex option structures as individual legs for clearing and reporting purposes, after a contract is agreed on at its net debit/credit price, users can 13 These potential adverse consequences are embedded in the testimony of the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, who stated: -We also will require that regulators carefully police any attempts by market participants to use spurious customization to avoid central clearing and exchanges. In addition, we will raise capital and margin requirements for counterparties to all customized and noncentrally cleared OTC derivatives. Given their higher levels of risk, capital requirements for derivative contracts that are not centrally cleared must be set substantially above those for contracts that are centrally cleared.‖ (Geithner, 2009) negotiate the actual leg prices prior to final trade acceptance (Figure 4 ). At the end of a short RFQ period, subscribers can -Post to Block‖ for an RFQ they generated and move the request into the Block Trade facility to meet a second, pre-defined party and affect a cross between the best bid and offer prices 14 at the end of the associated RFQ period ( Figure 5 ). While the parties finalize the terms of a contract, the CCP evaluates the contract's risk (Section 4.2) and sets the clearing fees (Section 4.3). An RFQ platform would promote transparency and systemic risk management by increasing information in the OTC market and allowing all OTC contracts to be traded and cleared. Multi-party negotiations disseminate offer data to all market participants, reducing the informational asymmetry in the OTC market by allowing all traders, not just large financial institutions, to follow derivatives pricing and purchasing trends. This aggregation and dissemination would put all market participants on equal footing, preventing large financial institutions from secretly buying and selling large positions in the OTC market (although anonymity would be preserved). And because an RFQ platform could facilitate trading for any OTC derivative, provided the counterparties will pay for the associated risk, the government could require all economically material derivatives to be cleared, removing counterparty risk from the OTC market. This would clarify the vague requirement, found in current government proposals, to increase capital requirements for uncleared complex, non-standardized derivatives.
Centralized Clearing and Active Permissioning
From a risk management perspective, an essential difference between standardized and complex contracts is the ability to readily determine financial risk. The financial risk of a standardized position can be readily determined because the terms of the standard contract are known in advance, often with well specified underlyings. Employing only analytic VaR methods moves too far in direction of speed, sacrificing accuracy, particularly for positions involving lookback options, volatility contracts, and correlation contracts and for markets characterized by irregular probability distributions.
It is only possible to achieve both speed and accuracy in evaluating financial risk by combining analytic and Monte Carlo simulation methodologies (see Appendix 2). 19 The essential insight is to use analytic methods as an extrapolation function that is calibrated to the Monte Carlo simulations. It is common to use extrapolation methods involving splines (Miranda and Fackler, 2004) , which are readily implemented. Their principle detraction is that they are chosen for analytic convenience rather than for any particular relevance they have for evaluating financial risk. In contrast, analytic methods developed 18 By elemental we mean the irreducible lowest decomposable element of a complex contract. 19 Patent application Balson, et. al, 2003. in financial applications have a theoretical foundation based on limiting assumptions such as the analytic form of the distribution of price changes. 
Two-Part Pricing for Clearing
The advent of pre-execution clearing opens an array of possibilities for both private and public novation or government guarantees. The most efficient is a two-part pricing scheme based on Ramsey (1927) , where clearing customers pay an up-front price that covers origination and a variable fee in which retained risk is priced in proportion to the market value of the daily risk. Two-part pricing, which allows collateral or margins to be tailored to market conditions, is more efficient than a one part price with, or without, variable collateral requirements, under a variety of assumptions because it allows for a risk sharing equilibrium.
A pricing structure based on a per-transaction fee and margin requirement will not allow for efficient risk sharing in the presence of market risk that varies over time. Optimal risk sharing results from financial risk being shared by all parties to a contract, but margin requirements allocate all financial risk to the trading party, with no risk sharing. Consider a derivative contract among parties where party has a risk-averse utility function and initial wealth (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1988 1968; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1989; Allen and Gale, 1994) .
Efficient pricing is essential to adequately produce both the public and impure goods, since constrained pricing for clearing services necessarily generates an equilibrium off the efficient frontier. Over, or under, pricing of clearing services would lead to a suboptimal amount of risk being borne by the CCP and would distort the prices of OTC contracts. Moreover, current proposals for clearing OTC derivatives misprice their services by omitting a fee for systemic risk management.
Beyond facilitating the management of systemic risk and production of accurate price feeds, two-part pricing could provide compensation for both the public and private partners (see Appendix 3). Though per transaction fee pricing with margins compensates the CCP for origination, it does not compensate the government for the insurance it implicitly provides (Jones and Perignon, 2009 
Where a and b are parameters set by the CCP, x is a vector of the contract's financial risk, f is a vector of market price feeds, Z is a vector of contract positions, and M is the margin policy requirement.
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In a derivative exchange for standard contracts, the parameter b is set to zero as a matter of policy (since margin requirements, M, are set to reduce financial risk, x, to approximately zero). In this case, the parameter a is simply the standard clearing fee given a margin policy, M, that manages financial risk faced by the CCP. As noted above, setting b and M to eliminate financial risk is dominated by two-part pricing, a more efficient risk-sharing contract among private parties for most utility functions (Wilson, 1968) . Note that the two-part pricing presumes that financial risk, x, can be evaluated on an ex ante basis so that an efficient clearing contract can be priced. In practical terms, an efficient Ramsey contract means that the novation guarantor is fully compensated on an ex ante basis for the financial risk it undertakes in guaranteeing a contract and the guaranteed party's capital is used efficiently.
An essential component of the financial risk of an OTC derivative is liquidity. Liquidity is important when a party to a contract defaults, and the CCP attempts to sell that position to a new party. Since standardized derivatives can be traded in liquid markets, the CCP is likely to quickly find a buyer, and transfer the risk. But for customized derivatives, with highly illiquid markets, the CCP may be unable to sell the position or capture meaningful recovery and be forced bear the position's risk for some duration of the contract.
Customized contracts that are traded in illiquid markets pose a greater risk to the CCP, 22 This non-uniform pricing schedule is based on a simple two-part tariff, (Tirole, 2004) , composed of a fixed access fee, a, and a variable fee, b. Two-part pricing structures have been shown to be welfare maximizing a variety of contexts (Schamalensee, 1981; Goldman, et. al, 1984; Srinagesh, 1986) . A comparison of the welfare effects of per transaction fee and two-part pricing is contained in Appendix 4. 23 The exact functional form of x(M,f,Z) need not be specified here, except that it is a many-to-one map between the financial risk of individual markets and the financial risk of a complex position, and that the function is not guaranteed to have continuous moments. Indeed, for Regulation T margin requirements higher moments are non continuous in Z. i.e. the regulatory limitation on 50% leverage implies a discontinuity in the first derivative of x with respect to Z. and thus would be charged a larger variable fee than standardized contracts to compensate the CCP.
The role of a public guarantor introduces a public policy dimension to performance guarantees for financial contracts. Historically, the role of policy by regulated exchanges has been limited to setting M. This is inefficient in a public setting, but for a different reason than its inefficiency in a private setting. The incremental inefficiency is, of course, due to systemic risk. To efficiently account for this guarantee provision, we can modify the Ramsey pricing model to introduce a public guarantee component:
Where is a public charge for the implicit guarantee made by central banks as the lender of last resort, and P is the setting on current macroeconomic policy instruments.
This component allows policy makers to incorporate financial reality into their macroeconomic policy instruments.
Introducing the parameter raises both fair value and public policy issues. First, the nature of public policy in financial markets is not necessarily the same as the problem facing a private guarantor. A private guarantor faces the markets as they are, while a public novation guarantor seeks to modify perceived financial risks in order to promote economic growth. A private party must take perceived financial risks as a given for purposes of fair valuation, while the central bank or public partner can set macroeconomic policies with a view toward modifying perceived financial risks to achieve an alignment with long-term macroeconomic objectives (e.g. price stability, long-term growth).
In light of the uncertainties in setting macroeconomic policies, perceived financial risk among private parties given current macroeconomic policies should be expected to undershoot or overshoot (Dornbusch, 1976) . In essence, in the process of providing novation for guarantees for financial contracts a counter cycle policy can be implemented where the public novation guarantor may set c high during periods of low perceived risk in order to dampen -over exuberance‖, but set c low or even negative during periods of financial crisis. In setting novation guarantees for this one component, c, policy could achieve neutrality vis-à-vis public winners and losers in the market. The guarantee would apply uniformly rather than to market participants chosen on an ad hoc basis.
It is possible that the public partner's role in setting Ramsey pricing uniformly treats systemic risk across the business cycle, allowing the public guarantee to reinforce other macroeconomic policies. Though systemic risk is typically managed during a crisis, it could be managed across the business cycle; were it not for the -irrational exuberance‖ phase of the cycle, the depth of the crisis phase would likely be moderated. Two-part pricing allows the government to actively moderate the formation of asset price bubbles and limit the effects of the inevitable burst on the derivatives market. 
Novation vs. Guarantees
In the microstructure for the proposed public-private CCP, a critical question arises in regard to whether novation or a third party guarantee for contracts are provided in case of default. Novation has become the financial guarantee of choice in regulated contract markets (Williams 2001) . Novation means, literally, the remaking of the contract so that each original obligor (i.e., the parties to the derivatives contract) is entirely removed and is directly replaced by novator (i.e., the CCP). Though each party is replaced in the remade contract by the CCP, the contract has the same terms and conditions as the original contract. At the time of settlement or default, all enforcement and collection actions are taken directly against the novator and there are no direct transfers between counterparties. Because the CCP becomes a direct counterparty to each side of the trade, once novation occurs, the credit worthiness of the original counterparties is irrelevant to each trader as the traders only have a contractual obligation to the CCP. Novation completely isolates each party from the effects of a default by its counterparty, and indeed the counterparties may be anonymous.
Unlike novation, a guarantee is a contingent, secondary form of obligation that supplements, but does not replace, the original obligor. A CCP that only provides a thirdparty guarantee is only involved if one or more parties default. In case of default, demand must be made on the original obligator first, and that obligator must fail to perform before the CCP can be obligated to fulfill the contract. The CCP would typically only partially fulfill the contract and a haircut would be expected to be applied to the payments to each counterparty. A guarantee does not isolate the parties from the effects of a default by a counterparty, but it does cap the losses of each party.
An additional difference between novation and guarantees is the level of anonymity among traders. Novation allows for complete anonymity between trading parties and permits the CCP to set universal standards for determining credit worthiness. Since guarantees place much of the burden of determining creditworthiness on the trading parties, there can be no anonymity. Anonymity combined with an elimination of counterparty credit risk between buyers and sellers is largely responsible for the rapid growth in the volume of standardized financial contracts over the past 30 years. This growth has produced substantial benefits to the economy by making prices of financial products public information.
The choice between novation and guarantee determines the degree of active involvement by the public sector. A CCP that selects novation for all OTC transactions would require regular, direct involvement of the public sector in active management of the partnership.
The partnership would determine the credit standards for participation in the OTC trades and the government would be compensated for all systemic risk insurance. If a CCP only provides guarantees for OTC derivatives the government would be involved when defaults exceed the CCP's capital. 24 Clearly, the PPP must make a determination of whether they will implement for the microstructure a novation or third-party guarantee process.
Exchange External Reporting
Periodic reporting for OTC derivatives is conducted today under the Basel framework, but is largely on an ex post basis and is self-reporting with regulatory oversight. In principal, the majority of such contracts could be subsumed in the electronic exchange we
propose. This could be captured by an electronic submission that reports execution of contracts traded outside the exchange. Regulatory requirements would need to be developed that specify the types of firms subject to such reporting, the types of contracts requiring reporting, and the speed at which the reporting would be conducted. At a minimum, systemically large firms should report substantially all of their capital structure continuously so the public clearing component could be based on full knowledge of the financial risks.
A critical microstructure design issue is the determination of the price of risk, the second component of (1). The CCP will only have a lens on the portfolio of contracts held on the PPP exchange. If large offsetting positions are held off the exchange and unknown to the CCP, the price of risk will be distorted. For the systemic risk component, the third term of (3), the current treasury proposal suggests that at least large financial institutions should face mandatory requirements to report all OTC derivatives on a periodic basis (Treasury, 2009) . Such external mandatory reporting will provide the CCP some visibility into the net notional exposure but will not allow mark-to-market measures of the price of risk for each of the counterparties or transactors.
An alternative microstructure is to also allow voluntary reporting for any transactor in addition to periodic reporting for the large, systemic risk sourced financial institutions.
Clearly, as the price of risk for that portion of portfolio on the CCP platform for a particular counterparty begins to rise there will be incentives for that transactor to post additional collateral. This voluntary conduct will be in the self-interest of a transactor if their overall portfolio includes offsetting positions or hedged transactions. The posting of such exposures will lower the clearing fees, depending of course on the counterparty credit risk associated with any posted external transactions.
Conclusion
A crucial lesson from the current financial crisis is the need for regulatory certainty.
Consider the case of Lehman Brothers: given the government intervention in the sale of Bear Stearns, most assumed the government would actively prevent bankruptcy by
Lehman. The unexpected bankruptcy, with debts listed at $613 billion at time of filing, triggered a worldwide panic in equity markets and near catastrophic tightening of credit markets. When market participants are unable to anticipate the reaction of the government, the failure of a single firm can be amplified throughout the global economy, causing massive losses in the economy that exceed the value of the firm by orders of magnitude. Only when the -rules of the game‖ are known beforehand by all market participants can the effects of financial instability be dampened. The creation of a CCP is essential to establish ex ante the rules for the OTC derivatives markets.
A government-private partnership engaged in providing clearing services for OTC derivative markets is feasible and does not require a technology leap. We have argued here that one dimension of the technology leap is enabled by the technological innovation of real-time permissioning and novation or guaranteeing of OTC financial contracts.
Equally necessary is the real-time monitoring by the centralized clearing organization during the negotiation of OTC financial contracts. This requires that all derivative exchanges and dealer networks be integrated into a cohesive uniform communication and permissioning network using FIX software communication protocol routines 25 .
Due to macroeconomic and psychological risk factors, there is likely to always be a cycle of perceived financial risk in most markets. In recent history we have witnessed extremely low levels of perceived risk (e.g. 2006) and extremely high levels of perceived risk (e.g. 2008/9). Public policy can counter that cycle and most governments and central banks proactively use a variety of financial tools to moderate excesses in both directions (e.g. monetary and fiscal policies).
The motivation for our proposed public-private partnership is no less than the survival of the financially interdependent world that has been created over the last twenty years.
Increasingly sophisticated financial market participants have learned how to maximize the value they extract from the implicit guarantees provided by the world's central banks or -lenders of last resort‖. In the most recent financial crisis, exercising that guarantee has pressed the financial capacity of the global economy to an extreme not previously witnessed even in the Great Depression. The benefits of the past year's ex post and haphazard intervention have been concentrated among financial market participants who exploited the under priced guarantee creating a system that is fraught with moral hazard.
The next cycle can only be more extreme as a consequence and a continued failure to allocate the costs and benefits of the implicit, ad hoc public guarantee could well continue to generate periodic catastrophic results.
It is our view that regulations that inhibit financial innovation are not the answer, whether those regulations restrict specific forms of contracts or restrict the allocation of economic rents among the producers of financial products (e.g. executive compensation and fee sharing). Such restrictions reduce economic efficiency and thus retard economic growth.
Our proposal enables the public sector to be actively engaged in managing financial risk over the business cycle that is potentially uniform, agnostic to winners/losers, efficient, and mutually reinforcing with other macroeconomic policies.
Appendix 1. Control Rights in a Public-Private Partnership
Our framework for assigning control rights in a PPP is sourced with the incomplete contracting literature (Hart and Moore 1988; Hart and Moore, 1999) . 26 In this literature, a control right is the authority to make a decision with respect to both anticipated events and events that are not foreseen in the contract. The allocation of control rights can determine whether a partnership will operate efficiently.
In the case of a partnership that produces a pure private good (i.e., the facilitation of transactions), the partners have an incentive to underinvest because the benefits from their investment can be lost in ex post renegotiation (Grossman and Hart 1986 ).
Grossman and Hart (1986) used a two-period model with two firms. In the first period, the firms create a contract that allocates control rights and each firm makes relationshipspecific investments, . In the second period, each partner makes production decisions, , based on the control rights assigned in the contract, which determine the partnership value for partners 1 and 2, and . Both the investments and the decisions are uncontractible in period 1, but once the decisions are made, each partner is presumed to have equivalent information about their values.
In the first period, the firms make the relationship-specific investments noncooperatively.
After these investments are observed, the second period begins and the control rights, which were allocated by the first-period contract, are exercised. These decisions can be made noncooperatively or cooperatively, through costless renegotiation, because the choice of becomes contractible in period 2. It is unlikely that the noncooperative equilibrium decisions, , will maximize the partnership's value, so the firms can benefit from renegotiation in period 2, after observing the investment decisions from period 1, which are chosen in anticipation of the renegotiation, and create a contract specifying the optimal and . Grossman and Hart (1986) assumed the firms divide the surplus from the joint venture symmetrically. This outcome will generally be inefficient as both firms underinvest and do not maximize the ex ante value of the partnership.
If one firm's first-period investment has a larger effect on the partnership's value than the other firms, the contract should assign the firm with the more valuable investment full control over decision making in the second period. 27 Under this circumstance, the allocation of control in the first period provides the firm with the most valuable investment an incentive to invest optimally. When the firm whose investment has a larger impact on the partnership's value invests optimally, the partnership's value is maximized.
Thus, underinvestment can be mitigated, in a joint venture that produces a private good, if the contract assigns agents control rights to assets on which their production is dependent. In a public-private CCP, this would mean the private partner, who has the resources and experience to make the most valuable investment, would be given the control rights over the facilitation of transactions. Besley and Ghatak (2001) extended the incomplete contracting framework to a partnership that produces a public good. In their model, two agents, n and g, make relationship specific investments, , , that increase the nonrival and nonexcludable benefits generated by a project, . Each agent's valuation parameter, , determines his or her respective payoffs: g's payoff is and n's payoff is . The first-best levels of investment, which maximize the joint payoff , are generally not reached because the investments are not contractible and each agent will posses bargaining power once the investments are 27 Under this circumstance, the allocation of control in the first period provides the firm with the most valuable investment an incentive to invest optimally. When the firm whose investment has a larger impact on the partnership's value invests optimally, the partnership's value is maximized. Thus underinvestment can be mitigated, in a joint venture that produces a private good, if the contract assigns agents control rights to assets on which their production is dependent.
sunk. If the parties engage in ex post Nash bargaining, with a symmetric split of the surplus, the ex ante investment decisions will not be optimal because the partners will receive only a fraction of the social benefit generated by their investment. Besley and Ghatak (2001) demonstrated that the project's joint surplus will be maximized by allocating all control rights to the partner that assigns the highest monetary value to the project. The partner with the highest valuation has the incentive to invest optimally and this assignment of authority allows that partner to do so. Thus, when a public good is produced by a partnership, the agent's valuation of the output generated, and not the relative value of their investment, should determine the allocation of control rights. In a public-private CCP the public partner, who values transparency most, would be given control over the production of the public good.
Most of the control rights literature has focused on the optimal allocation of control rights when producing either a private good or a public good, and though we can glean useful 
The symbol denotes the result of calculating value at risk by using the most appropriate available methods and technology where computational speed is not required.
To be explicit about the dependence of , it may be written as to emphasize that value at risk is taken with respect to a specific confidence level , a specific time horizon , and a specific valuation methodology . in practice is approximated using combinations of simulation, decision tree, historical, or parametric methods. For many portfolios of interest, accurate estimation of requires very large Monte Carlo simulations, and when early exercise of options is considered a stochastic dynamic programming approach. Because evaluating is computationally expensive, parametric methods are often utilized to achieve approximate results more rapidly. In the literature, many of the practical applications for computing value at risk rely on parametric methods.
In one parametric method, the mathematical form of the distribution on is restricted by assuming that has derivatives with respect to each argument, that the state variables are the prices of the deal elements, and that the periodic changes in value of with respect to each argument are jointly normally distributed with mean zero. This is called the delta-normal method, which will be denote by . The value of the contract, given the assumptions, will be called . The parametric approach assumes . can be expressed as,
where is a vector of for all , is the transpose of , is the percentile of the standard unit normal distribution, is the covariance matrix for the joint normal distribution on returns to , and is the derivative of with respect to time
Other preferred embodiments may utilize a more appropriate parametric method than presented in equation (5); however, the present invention will be explained with respect to (5) for purposes of clarity.
It is observed that there are many methods of computing value at risk, and among them are , which is intended to produce an accurate estimate of value at risk, and , which is intended to be computationally fast. Other parametric forms could be used. For example, in applications referred to as extreme value theory, the parametric VaR will use a formula that is only intended to approximate the tail of the distribution since that is the region of most interest.
The method applies this observation to insert control variables into the standard parametric VaR equations in a manner such that the parametric equations result in a closer approximation to . The new estimate of value is called a risk position risk to emphasize its modification from the standard form and may be written as: (6) and solved for the control variables that minimize the difference as in equation (5) 
or some other method may be used for choosing the control variables . For example, a maximum likelihood estimate could be used, or changes could be minimized to the control variables over time.
To further illustrate the approach, equation (5) is modified with several sets of control variables and a vector that are multiplicative factors applied to and to produce
The purpose of these control variables is to adjust the result of the parametric estimate of value at risk so as to better approximate the result of . Other parametric forms would have control variables appropriate to the particular parametric formulation. A specific embodiment uses a version of parametric value at risk will be referred to as .
The control variables can be chosen with the viewpoint that can generally be computed within a 24-hour period, while is generally constrained to tight time limits in order to support a rapid throughput of processing transactions. The calculation of is performed by the real-time position risk system, while calculation of is performed by a simulation-based position risk supervision system. The essential feature of the combined systems is that is calculated in real time, while is calculated periodically.
Figure 6: The DJI, OEX, and NDX Indices A per-transaction fee pricing schedule with collateral requirements, which is used by all private CCPs, is very unlikely to efficiently price risk in this simple contract. The typical 2:1 leverage cap for equities will increase inefficiency by forcing unnecessary margin calls. Pricing novation with our proposed two-part price schedule to cover both origination and the variation in risk over time allows for efficient pricing of risk and for margin calls to be tailored to market conditions. A two-part pricing schedule adds value to the novation process and the clearing parties can be compensated accordingly.
The correlations between the underlying assets over the course of the contract, March 25, 2007 to March 24, 2008 . Among the underlying indices, DJI was the least volatile, followed OEX and NDX ( Figure 8 ). Given these correlations and volatility, the exponentially weighted daily volatility of each index grew dramatically over the course of the contract (Figure 9 ). The position value for Party A initially increased and then decreased (Figure 10 ) toward the end of the period. The variation in the position value was about +/-10% over the period.
The position risk for Party A, measured as the 99% 10-day VaR, grew approximately sixfold in response to the increasing daily volatility (Figure 11 ). Figure 11 illustrates why a one part clearing fee is inefficient: a one-part fee must either compensate the clearing firm for the variation in risk over the life of the contract or require the posting of cash collateral as the position value and/or position risk varies.
Pricing a potential six-fold change in risk upfront present insurmountable financial challenges, which is why no current CCP prices such a product. However, as the -lender of last resort‖ the government implicitly does guarantee at least some portion of such contracts at a price of zero. Rather than forcing liquidation or posting additional collateral, a two-part clearing fee raises the daily charge for risk as risk increases, as illustrated in Figure 12 . It is true that by increasing the daily risk charge, the parties will likely find their position less attractive economically and may choose to hedge or liquidate. But that is an economic decisions and not a constrained decision. Risk-based charges compensate for the increased market risk, while retaining positive control over risk exposure, in contrast to a fixed-fee structure (Figure 15 ) that does not respond to changes in risk. Consider the transactor surplus generated by the per-transaction fee and two-part pricing schedules (Dionne, 1991) . In a per transaction fee pricing schedule, novation is priced competitively to just cover total losses, , where C is expected cost of default per contract and X is the total number of contracts cleared. The transactor surplus generated by clearing contracts is,
where is determined by the inverse demand function for clearing, .
In a two-part pricing structure, the CCP charges an up-front fee, a, and variable, risk based fee, b. The transactor surplus generated when contracts are cleared is (10) where is the welfare maximizing amount of clearing, given the inverse demand function, which is found by solving (11) where M is the cost of monitoring risk.
The CCP's profit
The value of clearing to the transactor is maximized when the variable fee is equal to the marginal cost of risk, , if this cost of monitoring risk is low enough to allow for non-negative profits,
The transactor will prefer two-part pricing if .
Combining (13) and (14) yields,
which shows that two-part pricing is more efficient that per transaction fee pricing when the costs of monitoring risk are less than the reduction in default losses, since , minus the reduction in benefits from derivatives trading.
